Aim

The aim of this report is to evaluate the recent community intelligence project (i-NSI) carried out in the Inverclyde area of K Division, Strathclyde Police. The project involved the implementation of ‘intelligence-orientated Neighbourhood Security Interviews’ (known as i-NSI). Originally developed by Martin Innes and colleagues at Surrey University, i-NSI is an IT-supported method for police personnel to conduct interviews with community members.

The evaluation has a number of key objectives. These are:

- To examine the implementation of the i-NSI approach to gathering and analysing community intelligence, and in doing so assess the practicality of its use within a policing environment
- To assess whether the i-NSI approach generates information that is strategically and/or tactically useful for policing within K Division
- To assess whether the i-NSI approach also generates information that has value in terms of identifying organised crime ‘traces’ within K Division, whether that be in terms of information on direct activity or indirect impact.
- Finally, the evaluation seeks to formulate recommendations relating to the future possible use of i-NSI within Scottish policing

Background

The i-NSI process was developed as part of the National Reassurance Policing Programme and is designed to guide the systematic collection of community intelligence in a way that facilitates and informs policing responses that are consistent with the principles of the Signal Crimes Perspective. In mid 2010 it was agreed by DCC Mr Richardson and the then T/ACC SDOC Mr Nicolson that Strathclyde Police would be willing to support a community intelligence research project jointly delivered by the Universities’ Police Science Institute (UPSI) based at Cardiff University, Wales and the Scottish Institute of Policing Research (SIPR). The project would pilot the use of i-NSI in Scotland.
The Signal Crimes Perspective, as principally developed by Innes (2004), critiques earlier criminological models that present a linear relationship between local disorder, fear of crime and actual crime levels (e.g. principally the ‘broken windows’ thesis of Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Innes, demonstrated that measured ‘fear of crime’ often fails to correspond to a particular level of crime, nevertheless he highlighted the importance of often ‘trivial’ local incivilities in informing people’s judgements about risk.

Innes developed an approach for unpacking how people interpret crime and disorder, focussing on how a particular crime or disorder incident is ‘expressed’ (how somebody describes the crime or disorder), its effect (how it impacts on them in terms of behaviour, thinking, or feelings), and finally its content (how the incident informs their sense of risk or threat) (Innes 2007). These elements together constitute a ‘signal’, and for Innes it is identifying, analysing and targeting the most prominent signals within a community that is key to successful reassurance policing. What is required to combat ‘signal crimes’ and ‘signal disorders’ are effectively tailored ‘control signals’ (typically deriving from police actions) that if tailored well may have a positive impact on peoples’ sense of security (Innes 2004). So the advantage of SCP, is that rather than focussing on crimes or disorders that may be prominent in police statistics but which may not be prominent in informing a particular communities’ sense of order and control – or conversely focussing on vague measures of ‘fear of crime’, signal crimes and disorders are inherently grounded and ‘citizen focussed’ (Innes 2005, p. 195), targeting police resources on incidents that are most visible and impactful in a specific community.

Consequently, SCP provides a framework for generating a particular sort of community intelligence that in turn allows the police to target their efforts on those issues that are having a disproportionate impact on a given community. To facilitate and ensure the robust implementation of SCP, Innes and colleagues developed software and a database especially designed for the purpose of collecting, mapping and analysing signal crimes and disorder (i-NSI). This IT-driven solution has now been used in several UK police forces (including South Wales Police and Lancashire Constabulary), by local authorities (notably the London Borough of Sutton) and internationally (by the police in the Netherlands and Victoria Police in Australia). Results from these areas where this community intelligence approach has already been used are reportedly encouraging. Key findings include:

Significant reductions in calls for service for the police to deal with ASB;
- Significant increases in contact with local people who not normally attend local meetings with the police or respond to surveys;
- Creation of a rich intelligence picture for local neighbourhoods using a methodology which can be scaled up to allow for city-wide analysis (Innes et. al., 2010).
The Strathclyde i-NSI pilot

The pilot was run in 2011 with the principal aims of testing whether this approach improved the capture of community information on those local crimes and disorders that emitted the strongest ‘signal’ in terms of being key drivers of community anxiety, and to assess in turn whether this information could be usefully collated and analysed to inform policing responses that might, in turn, better reassure and boost community confidence in the police. These aims were to be pursued through:

- The introduction of a tailored approach to facilitate the systematic collection and analysis of community information utilising specialist software.
- The training by UPSI staff of police analysts and community police offices in the SCP approach and in the use of the software.
- Collecting information on signal crimes and disorders – using the software – by sampling a selection of community-members in different geographic areas. The areas were located within the same Strathclyde police division.
- Analysing the information collected to produce community profile reports

It was hoped that in capturing information on signal crime and disorders that some of this information would either directly relate to organised crime activity, or might indirectly signify the impact of organised crime on the community. No additional questions or steer however was added to the main data collection process, rather the evaluators initially looked to assess whether such information might naturally be elicited through the conventional use of i-NSI.

In practical terms i-NSI involves members of the public being interviewed in their homes or work places by officers from Safer Neighbourhood Teams using laptop computers. The questions and software are designed to identify the triggers behind matters of concern. The software at the very top-level is highly flexible in terms of how it allows respondents to identify and locate incidents that are of concern to them. Respondents are not forced to respond to a list of presented incident types and to orientate themselves to these. Rather, they are free to talk about any locally-grounded incident that concerns them (in SCP terminology this is ‘the expression’). These may range from general environmental and behavioural drivers to more serious criminal incidents. Matters of concern can be tied to geographical areas and groups of people, and may also yield some very specific information about individual crimes or perpetrators. In addition, the software prompts officers to try to elicit both the ‘effects’ and the ‘content’ of incidents, allowing one to assess seriousness in terms of how it impacts on respondent’s emotionally and behaviourally.

The computerised data capture and analysis package allows Police and partner agencies to identify and target the crime and disorder incidents which have a disproportionate impact upon neighbourhood security. The intelligence
from neighbourhood security interviews identifies the signals impacting on community confidence. The results provide a mechanism to help improve the response of Police and partners to community concerns and needs.

**Area Selection and Socio Demographic Profiles**

It was agreed that the pilot interviews would be conducted within Inverclyde wards (for an overview see Map 1), Gourock, Larkfield, Port Glasgow, and Kilmacolm.

**Gourock** – See Map 2

Historically Gourock grew from a small fishing village which later became involved in work such as herring curing, copper mining, rope making, quarrying, small craft repair and Chandlery (sale of ship equipment). Gourock was also a popular destination for tourism from the late 19th to early 20th centuries and hosts a ferry port with a linking rail service.

Most of the data zones in Gourock are comparatively affluent. Two of the data zones in the Gourock Bay and Coppermine areas (A6 & B2 respectively) show some level of deprivation as they are among the 26% most impoverished data zones in Scotland. It appears that only these two data zones are above the national average for drink and drug related hospital episodes. The education, skills and training levels for all data zones also appears to be favourable.

**Larkfield** – See Map 3

With the exception of data zones B9 and B10, most of the Larkfield area is very deprived, within the 27% most impoverished SIMD ranked data zones in Scotland. Indeed, many data zones were within the 15% most impoverished data zones in Scotland.

Data zones C3, B6 and C2 were particularly high above the national average (ANA) for hospital episodes related to alcohol (423% ANA, 275% ANA & 235% ANA respectively) Similarly data zones C1, C2 and C6 were high above the national average for hospital episodes related to drugs (374% ANA, 209% ANA & 186% ANA respectively).
Port Glasgow – See Map 4

Historically modern Port Glasgow was build to house shipyard workers. The industry has now declined and this is believed to have affected present day levels of poverty.

Most of the data zones in Port Glasgow are very impoverished. The Devol and Whitecroft areas (data zones B4, B5 & B8 on current maps) appear to be the most affluent areas within port Glasgow but these are still in the lower half (worst off) of all Scottish data zones. These 3 data zones had the highest level of education, skills and training in Port Glasgow.

Some data zones were below the national average for alcohol and drug related hospital episodes however most were over, some extremely so (data zone B3 748% above national average). There are also a high number of derelict sites in Port Glasgow which are believed to have a negative effect on residents’ quality of life.

Kilmacolm – See Map 5

This is a highly affluent area with all data zones in the top half of all Scotland’s data zones. Generally levels of health, education, service access and crime etc. are very favourable. Kilmacolm has been a prehistoric settlement which is linked to religious and Medieval Feudal society but most of Kilmacolm was built in 1896 with the construction of a railway.

The administration of the Pilot

Project Team

A Project Team comprising of Nick Fyfe (SIPR Dundee), Lesley Bain (Head of Analysis & Performance, Strathclyde Police), Simon Mackenzie (SCCJR/SIPR Glasgow), Niall Hamilton-Smith (SCCJR/SIPR Stirling), Ben Cavanagh (Scottish Government), Alistair Henry (SIPR), Trudy Lowe (UPSI), Charlotte Leigh (UPSI), Catherine Skinner (then Scottish Government) and Alexis Cran, (Principal Analyst Strathclyde Police) met on Tuesday 29th March 2011 to obtain a briefing on the project, review and confirm the overall project plan and timetabling.

Simon Mackenzie and Niall Hamilton-Smith also had a researcher role, undertaking an evaluation of the pilot. They undertook participant observation through their involvement in police and analyst training events, as well as through their participation in a small number of fieldwork interviews. They also conducted a focus group, and administered a short questionnaire with officers at the end of the data collection period.
**Timetable of events**

Table one provides details of the Project timetable. Some dates had to be rescheduled to allow for operational duties:

### Table 1: i-NSI Project Timetable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date/location</th>
<th>Activity/Purpose</th>
<th>Attendees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30/03/2011 Greenock Police Office</td>
<td>Local Co-ordination team meeting to review requirements and resource allocation</td>
<td>Trudy Lowe and Charlotte Leigh (UPSI), George Nedley, Mark Shepherd, Lesley Bain and Alexis Cran (Strathclyde Police)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/03/2011 Greenock Police Office</td>
<td>Pre Briefing for officers and analysts.</td>
<td>Local Strathclyde Officers, Analysts, SIPR interviews and other stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/04/2011 Greenock Police Office</td>
<td>Interviewer training to cover interviewing skills and the i-nsi software for analysts and officers</td>
<td>All those to be trained as interviewers and analysts – local officers, Strathclyde analysts, SIPR interviewers and other stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 - 14/04/2011</td>
<td>Field Training (accompanied interviews)</td>
<td>Local Strathclyde officers, SIPR interviews and UPSI staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/04/2011</td>
<td>Local and SIPR Management meeting to plan ongoing management</td>
<td>UPSI staff and Strathclyde Police coordination staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data collection period – 4 week period which interviewers will conduct the required number of interviews. This was further extended due to resilience issues.</td>
<td>Trained Interviewers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 – 15/05/2011</td>
<td>Analyst Training (3 days classroom training)</td>
<td>Local Strathclyde analysts, SIPR staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 – 23/06/2011</td>
<td>Analytical reports enhanced by analysts</td>
<td>Euan MacDonald and Clare Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/08/2011 Ivy Lodge</td>
<td>Stakeholder Meeting</td>
<td>Project Team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Training**

Training was provided by UPSI staff with initially analysts and officers together being shown and trained on the software. This was very comprehensive and gave an overview of the system as well as an explanation of what we were doing and why. Further training was carried out by UPSI staff with the analysts when the data was collected to facilitate generation of reports.

**Provision of Resources**

It was agreed that Strathclyde would supply four analysts to perform the analysis. Three were from the K Division analytical team supplemented by an analyst from the Strategic Unit (Force Hub). Prior to the analysis, the analyst from the Strategic Unit compiled socio-demographic profile of each area using the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation data. These profiles provided details on population, SIMD ranking, health levels, education, skills and training, employment and income levels and service access. These profiles were to assist in the final analysis.

Initially it was agreed that community officers from the two specific areas would participate in the interviewing. Two teams of five officers were identified with the officers being from varying degrees of service and experience. The two teams were managed by two sergeants who were in charge of logistics, planning and change of shifts to accommodate the interviews.

The initiative was extremely resource intensive with various operational issues and staffing levels often having an impact on the number of interviews planned each day, with interviews often having to be rearranged at short notice. In addition officers had to re-roster days off to undertake interviews.

**The fieldwork**

**Identification of interviewees**

It was important within this project that in terms of the interviews carried out there was a good representation of the local community. Guidelines were given out by the Project team with suggested numbers for age groups, gender and ethnicity. Findings from both areas confirm that there were almost equal numbers of males and females. There was also a representative sample of age ranges and for those living and working in the area. The demographics of the area limited the numbers of other ethnicities included in this project.

In terms of how individuals were chosen to be interviewed within output areas, the approach taken was not one of random sampling, but was based around purposively identifying individuals who had a good knowledge of their community, or individuals who Innes would term ‘neighbourhood sentinels’ namely individuals with an ‘interest or investment in the local neighbourhood, such that they take a greater interest in the fortune of their local area’ (Innes and Lowe, in press, p. 6). The intention was not simply to sample any existing
narrow selection of community ‘representatives’, but to try and identify in each geographic unit individuals who had a real insight into what was going on in their neighbourhood.

**Data Collection**

Trudy Lowe from UPSI had initially suggested 156 interviews within a specific timescale. It was anticipated that 3 respondents would be interviewed for each of the 26 data zones. The interviews themselves took approximately one to one and a half hours often with arrangements made for travel. There were several issues with resourcing and operational activities during this initiative which resulted in the timescale being extended and the number of interviews reduced. This meant that total coverage of the area was not achieved.

Table 2 displays the suggested breakdown of respondents provided by UPSI for each of the two sub-areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Sample Split by Gender</th>
<th>Target Sample Split by Age</th>
<th>Target Sample Split by Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male 37</td>
<td>Female 41</td>
<td>15 – 19 (47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 - 44 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45 – 64 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65 - 84 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>White 75 (96%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other 3 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 illustrates the actual breakdown of respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gourock and Larkfield</th>
<th>Port Glasgow and Kilmacolm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Interviews Planned</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Interviews conducted</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male 26 (47%)</td>
<td>25 (45%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female 25 (45%)</td>
<td>31 (55%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not specified 4 (7%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White 54 (98%)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 16 – 29 10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 30 – 49 25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 50 – 69 18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 70 and over 2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident in area 46</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work in area 26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A natural limitation of the survey approach adopted – and indeed of most similar community consultation/survey exercises – was that under-16s were not interviewed, and given that community concerns about crime and incivility often focus on the activity of ‘young people’ the exclusion of a large proportion of that group clearly needs to be recognised. Indeed given that research would suggest that the same age group is also disproportionately subject to criminal victimisation as well as many other forms of harassment and nuisance behaviours (e.g. David, D. J. et. al, 2001; Finkelhor 1997) the importance of supplementing these sorts of general surveys with a more bespoke gauging of youth experiences/attitudes has to be emphasised.

In the 16-24 age group the achieved sample was roughly in proportion to the percentage of that age group in the general local population. The gender split in the sample seems reasonable, though officers admitted that they found it difficult (or were reluctant) to make appointments to interview female respondents within their homes. This may have biased the responses to some extent. Another limitation of the sample was that the officers were not able to interview evenly across the geographic-units, and 11 output areas (out of a total of 52) had no interviews conducted in them at all, whereas a corresponding number were significantly over-sampled. After discussion with Superintendent George Nedley and Chief Inspector Mark Shepherd, it was agreed that the interviewees may have been chosen by sticking rigidly to the criteria given, and this may not always have resulted in the best people being selected to interview.

Feedback from the officers involved was mixed. Officers were positive about the general aims for the pilot and were keen to get involved in a new form of consultation. Senior management have also highlighted that an advantage to this type of consultation is that a wider range of people become involved, reaching beyond the usual community councillors and those community members who are always predisposed to get involved in consultations.

Having conducted the pilot interviews, officers did believe, based on their own existing local knowledge that the information collected was valid, and importantly that the methodology did reliably help elicit the emotions, thinking and actions associated with identified crimes and incivilities. In spite of this, officers after the pilot held, with two partial exceptions, generally negative views of the i-NSI software. This is not in itself particularly surprising or noteworthy given that the introduction of new IT technologies in the police or other organisations are rarely greeted warmly (Manning 1992). However, officers did have some very specific concerns about the usefulness of the laptop-based approach to interviewing members of the community.

Principally officers felt that the computer impeded rapport and the flow of information between them and respondents, over-formalising the encounter whilst also making it difficult for them to demonstrate the sorts of interpersonal skills that are associated with good qualitative interviewing (e.g. being seen to be listening carefully, looking at the respondent as opposed to looking at the computer screen etc.). Engendering rapport for officers was
important not only in terms of eliciting useful information but also in terms of communicating appropriate sympathy and reassurance. It may be that with more practice some of these difficulties may have been circumvented, but officers clearly felt that in the pilot these issues impacted on their interview performance. On a positive note, officers did like the simple functionality of the software. In particular they appreciated its flexibility in terms of it allowing one to map pretty much any problem or issue and to link it to any type of geographic space (e.g. not just a geocode/address point, but a linear form such as a length of road, or an area of green space).

The other key issue for officers was the sheer amount of resource required to achieve their quota of interviews and how ill the process sat with their existing community policing duties. The difficulty here in making a definitive judgement about i-NSI is that the pilot was conducted against the backdrop of recent, and very significant reforms to community policing across Strathclyde. As with any reform programme, teething problems were being worked through and individual officers were having to adjust to significantly new working roles, shift patterns and community areas. It is impossible therefore to untangle some of the difficulties experienced with implementing the i-NSI pilot from these more general difficulties.

Analysis and Feedback

Trudy Lowe and Charlotte Leigh from UPSI came to Strathclyde Police HQ for 3 days to work with the four analysts identified and train them on the analytical part of the i-NSI software. The training involved working on the live data which would result in the actual reports being generated at the end of the session.

Feedback from the analysts was positive however the main criticism was the downloading of the data collected by Police officers which was cumbersome and time consuming. A lot of time was taken up combining and cleansing data when could have been spent on the actual analysis. The analysts felt that it would have been beneficial for the data to be already downloaded, cleansed and ready for analytical work. The versions of Excel and Word were newer than the analysts normally use and the mapping system was Mapinfo whereas the Strathclyde analysts usually use Arcgis.

In addition to the general answer to the questions asked to the interviewee, the advantage here is that the answers can be supplemented by the identification of actual areas on a map and further community intelligence and information. Intelligence can then be fed into the system by means of the Scottish Intelligence Database (SID) and can contribute to action plans and operations. This can also open up a number of further opportunities.

Again, on the negative side, there was the opinion that from the Police perspective there was a huge amount of work and time taken to do the interviews with the result that limited amounts of new information or intelligence were generated.
The information that was generated tended to be organised around locations, with multiple concerns clustering around these locations, rather than being problem-specific. The types of incidents also tended to be mostly low-level, focussing on incivilities such as litter, youths hanging around and threatening behaviour, though under-pinning these issues in both sub-areas were concerns with drug dealing and more serious forms of public violence.

The level of detail collected on each identified concern or problem was not particularly promising in terms of the potential for facilitating the sorts of targeted problem-solving envisioned by Innes, though this shortcoming must at least in part be fairly seen as understandable given the pilot status of the project, with officers having to familiarise themselves with the methodology and the technology.

Whilst most of the issues identified in the interviews were already known to the police, it has to be acknowledged that the areas chosen for the pilot were considered to have very-ingrained issues that were already very well-known. Community policing historically in Inverclyde has also been considered to be relatively robust, so again it may be unreasonable to have expected the pilot to throw up substantive amounts of new material. Whilst, the level of information gathered may not have been new, or sufficiently detailed to have great tactical value, the strategic value of the information in terms of clearly evidencing the issues of concern to local communities is potentially greater. Moreover, repeated sweeps of such a survey over time could have value in terms of tracking progress and performance. But given the amount of resources required to conduct this pilot sweep, the practicality of routinely employing such a method would have to be questioned.

**Final Reports**

A decision was made by the analyst members of the Project team for the initial reports generated by the analyst training session to be further enhanced by qualitative and quantitative information available from Police systems. Two of the analysts involved in the analysis of the interviews spent two further days developing and improving on the information they had to produce comprehensive and informative reports. Socio-demographic information was also added.

**Key Findings from Final reports:**

**Community Intelligence Report on Port Glasgow and Kilmacolm**

- The main problem signals in port Glasgow are groups of youths and public drinking
- W Road (Port Glasgow) has been highlighted as the main signal location. Youth disorder is a particular problem at the W Road Shops.
- W Road is most problematic during the evenings at weekends (every week). Police effectiveness was viewed positively by respondents however communication from the police was seen as poor.
• U Street is a problem area for drug dealing and the problems associated with drug use.
• U Street experiences all of these problems on a daily/weekly basis at no particular time of day.
• There were very few drug dealing crimes and incidents on U Street during a 3 month time period (March-May 2011) which indicates a lack of reporting and subsequent police action.
• While other locations were identified when looking at different signals and mastercodes, W Road and U Street were persistent locations in most categories
• J Avenue and K Avenue also appear to be streets affected by groups of youths which results in environmental problems like broken glass.

Discussion with Superintendent George Nedley and Chief Inspector Mark Shepherd confirmed that these findings were known to them through previous analytical products, incident analysis and intelligence. Actions plans and target packages were already in place to address these issues.

Key Findings from Final reports:

Community Intelligence Report on Gourock and Larkfield

The problems in Gourock and Larkfield are predominantly located within one location namely A Street/ B Street in Gourock

• The main issue relates primarily to groups of youths frequenting the area and causing a disturbance, drinking, misusing drugs and littering.
• The second issue highlighted is violence particularly around licensed premises.
• The majority of problems occur on a Friday and Saturday between the hours of 19:00 to 01:00 hours.
• One of the issues highlighted by respondents was the lack of police presence during these peak times.
• Crime and Incident analysis shows that anything in relation to youths and drinking in this area is not being reported to the police.

There are other locations within the data which have been highlighted for repeat issues, these include C Street where the following issues have been highlighted:

• Groups of youths are frequenting the area and causing a disturbance has been highlighted as a key issue.
• Public drinking at C Street is the main problem in terms of these youths
• As a result of the drinking there are issues regarding litter, particularly broken glass, cans and signs of drug misuse.
• Respondents felt that due to these factors the area had become a 'no-go' zone particularly at night.
• Examination of crime and incidents in the data zone covering this area shows that there have been just 9 crimes reported in the last three
months, 7 of which relate to thefts, one to a Breach and one to a vandalism. Incidents show a total of 49 calls in the area just 4 were in relation to drinking in public and 7 where the incident has been coded as 995 or 996.

Again after discussion with Superintendent George Nedley and Chief Inspector Mark Shepherd it became clear that the majority of these findings in incidents are already known with actions plans in place to address them.

Gathering information on Serious and Organised Crime

An additional aim for the Strathclyde pilot, was to assess whether the i-NSI tool had any value in terms of generating intelligence that would help enrich the existing picture of the links between Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) and communities. The pilot area was chosen in part, not only the basis of its willingness to engage with Reassurance Policing, but also on the basis that across the relevant police division a number of communities had long-established problems with high-levels of problematic drug use and drug dealing, and with supporting criminal infrastructure developed on the back of this. Earlier piloting of i-NSI in London had demonstrated its potential to generate community intelligence that shed a light not only on mundane ‘frontline’ incidents but also on more serious criminal activity and criminal associations (Innes and Lowe, in press).

The importance of understanding communities or ‘localities’ as a key aspect of global organised crime has been argued for academically (Hobbs 1998; 2001), but has also pre-occupied policy makers keen to understand the relationship between SOC and communities both in terms of the harms that the former may inflict on the latter, but also in terms of the functional inter-dependencies that can exist between the two. Early attempts had been made to chart this relationship as part of the Home Office’s organised crime research programme (see, Bullock et. al., 2009 and Hamilton-Smith and Patel 2010), and more formally community was put at the heart of Scotland’s own SOC strategy (Scottish Government 2009). To this end the Scottish Government invested resource in this pilot with the principal aim of determining whether it might prove to be a useful approach for generating SOC intelligence.

Given the general difficulties encountered in the pilot when utilising i-NSI, it is perhaps unsurprising to note that the main pilot did not throw up significant quantities of information on SOC. Items of information were rated by the researchers in terms of their potential to generate intelligence on SOC, and the 111 i-NSI interviews only generated 16 such items of information, mostly concerning drug dealing. This limited harvest was also explained by some of the officers involved as possibly inherent to the methodology, as they saw the collecting of information via a laptop as appearing officious, and being non-conducive to establishing the sorts of rapport and trust that might encourage disclosures about SOC. The approach taken to sampling also made it difficult
for officers to follow-up pre-existing contacts who they knew might be most fruitful in terms of supplying this sort of information.

The general line of questioning facilitated by the i-NSI software may also have been a factor in limiting the disclosure of SOC-relevant information, as the focus, in accordance with the Signal Crimes Perspective, was on identifying local 'signals', whether these be crimes or incivilities, that troubled respondents. This focus was reinforced by the software’s facility for mapping signals, and this generally seemed to encourage a focus on the most visible manifestations of crime and disorder rather than eliciting knowledge on more serious criminality. For instance, many identified signals related to drug dealing, but a combination of the software and possibly the limited expertise of the officers with the interview method, tended to result in only the incivilities associated with drug dealing coming to the fore. It should be noted that this could be entirely consistent with the Signal Crimes Perspective in so far as it may be that it is the superficial manifestations themselves that indeed trouble local residents rather than any under-pinning criminality. Prior Home Office research (Bullock et. al., 2009) would tend to support this explanation in that it found that the public do not generally connect organised crime to their anxieties or concerns about local crime and disorder. Nevertheless, from a problem-solving perspective having more detailed information that allows one to address the more serious criminality that may be at the root of a range of more superficial local signals would be useful.

To test the potential for gathering more detailed information on SOC than i-NSI appeared to facilitate, a small number of additional interviews were conducted by some of the more experienced officers, this time allowing them to use a paper-based schedule of questions¹, without recourse to laptops, that focussed not only on general concerns relating to crime and incivilities, but also drilled down more specifically to ask questions about suspicions or concerns relating to individuals, businesses, or business transactions. Though only a very small number of these interviews were conducted (n=6), they generated over 36 items of information that were rated as potentially useful. When these items were in turn checked against the Scottish Intelligence Database, nearly three quarters of all these items were already on that database in some form, and a small number of other items were considered potentially worthy of addition. It would appear therefore that respondents in the pilot areas did have more information on SOC it was just that the i-NSI methodology was not best placed to extract it.

Key findings from analysis of SOC data

Both similarities and dissimilarities are notable when comparing these key locations with the key locations generated through the main analysis of i-NSI data. Whilst in Gourock a number of key locations are prominent in both sets

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¹ This semi-structured schedule was a collaborative product between the researchers and the Force intelligence analysts.
of analyses, the key location in the main analysis for Port Glasgow, namely Road W, is of relatively minor prominence here. Moreover the analysis highlights locations that are not highlighted in the main analysis, namely Road X, Road Y and Road Z. The similarities are certainly due primarily to the correspondence between public drug dealing and a wide range of common crimes and incivilities that dominate the main analysis. The supplementary analysis here however, also picks up on some (mainly residential) locations that are associated with the residential addresses of key nominals (usually drug dealers) which do not necessarily feature as prominently in the main analysis.

In examining problem-type areas of possible SOCG impact, signals were banded together into drugs, violence, weapons, theft (arson and sexual offences were examined and then excluded as there were no relevant incidents). These problem types were based on the categories above with the exception that knife crime was included in the weapons category. The top problems highlighted by the supplementary analysis were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Drug dealing/manufacture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Drug dealing/manufacture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=2</td>
<td>Serious Violence</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Serious Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=2</td>
<td>Weapons (incl. knives)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Weapons (incl. knives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Commercial theft and robbery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A point of interest arising from this analysis is that information on organised crime activity was generally overlayed with signals identified by the main analysis. These signals, sometimes prominent, sometimes not, nevertheless suggest that organised crime activity is associated with more ‘mundane’ community level perceptions of crime and disorder.

To provide one example, in one residential street, the main analysis highlighted problems with street-level disorder and anti-social behaviour associated with youths. No mention was made of organised, or more serious crime. However, in our supplementary analysis this same residential street was identified as the address of a key drug dealer and his family, and explicit mention was made of how this drug-dealing activity, combined with the ‘bad company’ kept by the drug dealer’s son, drew in undesirables who were associated with the disorder and nuisance.

**Further Work**

During a discussion with Chief Inspector Mark Shepherd on 26/08/2011 it was confirmed that findings from i-NSI for the Port Glasgow area will be used in the Resilience Initiative Pilot. The Resilience Model will be piloted within Port
Glasgow by the SOA2 Social Regeneration Delivery Group. The Group has been keen to examine alternative approaches to social regeneration designed to have maximum impact, addressing some of the persistent barriers to success and focusing on how services are currently delivered and where gaps exist. Strathclyde Police have been tasked with mapping available data relating to the target area. The i-NSI report which has been supplemented with existing crime and incident data will provide the necessary data to do this.

Further discussion with Superintendent George Nedley on 14/11/2011 confirms that he plans to take the Port Glasgow report to stakeholders within the Community Engagement Network.

In relation to Gourlock/Larkfield area, the charity Action for Children will be providing this area with further funded posts of youth workers. The profile will help focus and inform this as well as providing them with a baseline.

**Conclusion**

The original briefing note compiled by Miss Lesley Bain, Head of Analysis & Performance in March 2011 detailed the results which she anticipated the Force would experience from this initiative. These being:

- Identifying signal crimes and disorder
- Establishing a community intelligence feed
- Building trust and confidence within the community
- Improving engagement skills of Community Police Officers
- Identifying areas where local partners work jointly with Strathclyde Police to solve problems.

From discussion with Senior Management from K Division and the analytical support, it is agreed that many of these have been achieved, although it has not been possible at this stage to assess the impact on community members.

However, although i-NSI is an innovative way of obtaining community information, in this instance it is felt that the initiative did not highlight any new information and largely validated what we already knew. This was true both for the results of the main pilot and for the results of the SOC pilot. The context of the pilots however may have some bearing here. The pilot areas are notable in terms of having long-ingrained crime problems, and this combined with a markedly stable population, would lead one to expect that both the police and community members would already have achieved a degree of consensus on what the main problems in the areas were. It may be that in communities that are less stable, or where crime problems are less stable, that i-NSI would be a valuable tool for generating new information.

The extent to which community members have relevant SOC information may be more surprising given that many of the existing entries on SID may have presumably been generated from more proactive police work or from arrests (e.g. from informants, offenders interviews etc.). Again, it may be therefore
that in less ‘known’ areas that this sort of approach to collecting community-intelligence could generate significant quantities of new information.

Overall, as stated above the i-NSI initiative was very labour intensive from the officers being trained, conducting the interviews, availability of supervisors, analysts being trained, analysis and additional work being carried out. The consensus was that relative to this input, the output in terms of the quality of the information obtained, may not have justified the resources utilised. Again however, the timing and context of the pilot has some bearing here. The implementation of the pilot during an ongoing period of re-organisation in community policing was problematic, and ultimately has made it impossible to assess the value of i-NSI against a single, stable model of community policing. Moreover, the rigid approach to sampling, combined with the inexperience of the officers in using i-NSI, may also have negatively impacted on the quality of information collected.

Given that Scottish policing is now undergoing a fundamental transition towards a new national police force (Scottish Parliament 2012), it would appear sensible to keep the possible utility of i-NSI under review. For instance, whether in its current – or in a modified form – it could make a contribution to production of local policing plans is one issue. Moreover, if the approach were employed longitudinally, then it could make a significant contribution in helping to inform the strategic direction and review of local policing. The Strathclyde pilot utilised i-NSI to produce only a single snap-shot of community signal crimes, whereas in other sites in England and Wales it is already been used successfully on a longitudinal basis (see Innes and Lowe, in press).

Any further extension of the i-NSI approach would also need to consider its tactical use alongside any strategic value. The methodology is designed not only to identify, locate and quantify signal crimes and disorder, but also to provide the quality and depth of information required to tailor policing and community safety responses.

Recommendations

for Strathclyde

- These reports should be used to generate multi-agency action plans to deal with issues identified, and complement ward priority setting and other intelligence gathering.
- If a future i-NSI project was planned for Strathclyde, a suggestion would be to do some specific work in an area, undertaking a full analysis of community issues first using existing police information to identify key issues, then using i-NSI to fill in any gaps. i.e. sectarianism, domestic abuse, youth gangs.

for Scottish policing
• It was suggested that wardens could be utilised in the future to carry out at least some of the interviews. A recommendation from one of the analysts who was involved in the i-NSI analysis was that analysts could also be involved in the interviews. The full or part-use of wardens to undertake survey sweeps using the i-NSI software has commonly been adopted in England and Wales.

• Another less resource-intensive approach to utilising i-NSI would be to use it on a rolling basis throughout the year (e.g. tasking community officers and wardens to complete a small number of surveys at opportune points throughout the course of the year).

• If i-NSI is tested again in Scotland it would be recommended that it is done so against the backdrop of a more stable community-policing environment to so that the practicality of the software, and the resource implications of its use, may be more objectively assessed.

• If i-NSI were utilised again in Scotland there are some modifications that would improve its usefulness within a Scottish policing environment. Aside from some terminological changes to question prompts and menus, the adaptation of the software to a less obtrusive and more portable IT-platform (e.g. a tablet instead of a laptop) may pay dividends in terms of ease of implementation, and in terms of the quality of public interactions.

• If the software were utilised again, more attention needs to be paid to achieving ‘reassurance wins’ on top of any intelligence gains. This recommends a focus on police-public interactions both in the administration of the surveys but also in the formulation and communication of subsequent responses. As i-NSI is designed to work within the framework of reassurance policing, in designing any future work the ACPOS Public Reassurance Strategy (ACPOS 2007) should be a key reference document.

• i-NSI may be helpful in flagging up some community signals that represent the ‘by-product’ of more hidden SOC activity. i-NSI would appear less useful in terms of generating substantive SOC intelligence. However, given the results derived from the supplementary SOC paper questionnaire, there would be merit in further developing a methodology for collecting robust community intelligence of this type.
References


Lowe, T. and Innes, M. (in press) ‘Can we speak in confidence? Community Intelligence and Neighbourhood Policing’ – Submitted to *Policing and Society*


MAPS


Map 2. Gourock

Map 3. Larkfield

Map 4. Port Glasgow.

Map 5. Kilmacolm